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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-16 (1989), 78-2-2(3) (e)(ii) 
and 78-2-2(4) (Supp. 1993). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Did the Utah State Tax Commission properly determine that 
fuel used in the operation of a motor vehicle on the public 
highways of the state was taxable? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Utah Legislature has codified the standard of review to 
be applied on appeals from the Utah State Tax Commission. Where 
the Legislature has granted discretion to the Commission to 
interpret a statute, the Commission's interpretation will be 
reviewed for reasonableness. See Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-
610(1)(b) (Supp. 1993). See also, South Davis Community Hosp. v. 
Dep't of Health, 232 Utah Adv. Rep. 32, 33 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); 
Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 588 
(Utah 1991) and Utah Dep't of Admin. Services v. Public Services 
Comm 'n, 658 P.2d 601, 610 (Utah 1983). 
The statute in question is Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-301-
1(2)(a) which provides for an exemption from Special Fuel tax. 
That section states: 
this exemption applies only in those cases where the 
purchasers or the users of special fuel establish to 
the satisfaction of the commission that the special 
fuel was used for purposes other than to operate a 
motor vehicle upon the public highways of the state; 
This language explicitly grants discretion to the Tax 
Commission. Therefore, this Court should uphold the Tax 
Commission's findings if they are within the "bounds of 
reasonableness." 
In reviewing the Tax Commission's findings under this 
standard the court should also consider that tax exemptions 
should be narrowly construed against the party seeking the 
exemption, and the party seeking the exemption bears the burden 
of showing they are entitled thereto. See Parson Asphalt 
Products, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 617 P.2d 397 (Utah 
1980) . 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The following determinative sections are set forth verbatim in 
Appendix 1. 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-102(3)(d)(i) (1992 & Supp. 
1993) . 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-102(7) (1992 & Supp. 1993). 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-301(1) (1992). 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-301(2) (1992). 
5. Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-301(3) (1992). 
6. Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-302(2)(a) (1992). 
7. Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-501(1)(7) (1992). 
8. Tax Comm. Rules R865-4-2D(B)(1)(2) (1993-94). 
9. Tax Comm. Rules R865-4-2D(D) (1993-94). 
10. Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610(1) (Supp. 1993). 
11. IFTA Articles of Agreement § I.C (1993). 
12. IFTA Articles of Agreement § III.C (1993). 
13. IFTA Procedures Manual § IV.A.9 (1993). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal of a the Tax Commission's denial of 
Petitioners' requests for refunds of special fuel taxes. The 
trucking companies affected by the Tax Commission decision below, 
as represented by C.V. Sohn, appealed the FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND FINAL DECISION of the Utah State Tax 
Commission ("Commission") dated November 23, 1993, (Appeal No. 
93-0615, consolidated with 93-0617, 93-0618 & 93-0619) (R. 4) 
wherein the Commission adopted the Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Final Decision detailed in its ORDER dated October 15, 
1993 as its Final Decision in all of the above mentioned cases. 
(R. 7) The October 15, 1993 order found that the Legislature 
defined 
special fuel as any fuel usable to operate £r propel a 
motor vehicle upon the highways of the state. The use 
of the word "or" to separate the word "operate" from 
"propel" evidences a legislative intent to list two 
separate and distinct processes either of which would 
render the special fuel subject to taxation. 
(R. 26, 27. original emphasis.) 
II. Course of the Proceedings 
Each of the several trucking companies involved in the 
consolidated appeals below filed amended fuel tax returns with 
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the Operations Division of the Utah State Tax Commission seeking 
refunds of tax paid on "special fuel" consumed in "non-
propulsion" operation of its vehicles. The Operations Division 
denied each of these refunds on the basis that fuel consumed in a 
"non-propulsion" mode was consumed while operating a vehicle on 
the public highways and was therefore taxable under Utah's Motor 
and Special Fuel Tax Act, Utah Code Ann. § 59-13 (The Act). Each 
company then filed a Petition for Redetermination with the 
Commission, seeking review of the Operations Division's decision. 
(R. 149) 
A prehearing conference was held April 22, 1993 at which the 
above-mentioned matters were consolidated. (R. 135) On August 
17, 1993 the Commission heard Petitioners' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment on the issue of Petitioners' liability for 
"special fuel" tax on fuel consumed during "non-propulsion" 
operation. The Commission issued its Order finding: "fuel 
consumed in the nonpropulsion [sic] operation of a motor vehicle 
on the public highways of the state is subject to special fuel 
tax" on October 15, 1993. (R. 27) 
On October 26, 1993, Respondent filed its Motion to Dismiss 
or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment. (R. 10) Pursuant to 
this motion and Petitioners' October 30, 1993 Stipulation (R. 9) 
the Commission issued its Final Order and Decision on November 
23, 1993. (R. 6) Petitioner's then filed this appeal. (R. 4) 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts were stipulated below. (R. W-10) 
1. Each of the Petitioners is an interstate trucking 
company which operates motor vehicles at various times upon the 
public highways of the State of Utah, transporting primarily 
property and goods. 
2. The vehicles operated by Petitioners consumed diesel 
fuel which is defined by § 59-13-102 as "special fuel". 
3. In the operation of their motor vehicles in the State 
of Utah, Petitioners normally and customarily consume special 
fuel while their vehicles are stopped with the motors running. 
4. Each of the Petitioners files a quarterly report 
showing the amount of special fuel consumed by each carrier 
without differentiating between that fuel which is consumed while 
its vehicles are being propelled over the highways of the state 
from that fuel which is being consumed while its vehicles are in 
a "non-propulsion" mode. 
5. Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-301(1)(2)(a) requires each of 
the Petitioners to pay a motor fuel tax on special fuel consumed 
in the operation or propulsion of a motor vehicle upon the public 
highways of the state. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Special fuel consumed by Petitioners is taxable. Exemptions 
from taxation must be narrowly construed against the taxpayer. 
Petitioners have failed to meet their burden of showing to the 
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satisfaction of the Commission that the fuel they claim is exempt 
falls squarely within the exemption provided by law. The Tax 
Commission found that Petitioners' non-propulsion operation was 
operation of a motor vehicle and thus taxable under Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-13-301. 
This court need not look beyond the plain language of the 
statutory exemption to determine the Legislature's intent in 
enacting it. It must be assumed that the Legislature uses each 
word in a statute advisedly. Thus, when the Legislature included 
the word "operate" in Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-301 taxing special 
fuel use it should be assumed that it intended that word to be 
understood in accordance with its regularly accepted meaning. 
Petitioners did not raise an Equal Protection issue or 
argument during the course of the proceedings below and should 
not be allowed to raise this issue for the first time on appeal. 
Even so, there is a rational basis to distinguish between 
Petitioners' operations and the exempt uses recognized by the 
Commission. 
Utah Law does not conflict with the International Fuel Tax 
Agreement (IFTA). IFTA allows each jurisdiction to determine 




I. FUEL CONSUMED BY PETITIONERS IS TAXABLE. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-301 states: 
(1) A tax is imposed at the rate of 19 cents per gallon 
on the sale or use of special fuel. . . . 
(3) The special fuel tax shall be paid by the user-
dealer in all cases where the special fuel is sold 
within the state and delivered directly into the fuel 
supply tank of a motor vehicle. . . .(emphasis added). 
This section imposes tax on the sale or use of special fuel 
within the state. Use is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-
102(7 ) and means: 
the consumption of special fuel for the operation or 
the propulsion of a motor vehicle upon the public 
highways of the state and includes the reception of 
special fuel into the fuel supply tank of a motor 
vehicle. (emphasis added). 
Under authority granted in Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-501, Utah has 
adopted the provisions of the International Fuel Tax Agreement 
("IFTA"). Section III.C of the IFTA Articles of Agreement 
states: 
All motor fuel acquired that is normally subject to 
consumption tax is taxable unless proof to the contrary 
is provided by the licensee. 
There is no question that the fuel sought to be taxed in the 
instant case was "used" by Petitioner. When the fuel is placed 
in the supply tank of Petitioners' motor vehicles the fuel is 
"used" as defined by statute. Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-301(3). 
The concept of fuel being taxable when "delivered into the fuel 
tank of a motor vehicle" is repeated in §§ 59-13-301(2) (c)f 59-
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13-301(4), 59-13-302(2)(a) and Rules R865-4-2D(B)(2), R865-4-
2D(C)(2) and R856-4-2D(D). Rule R865-4-2D(B) states: 
The tax shall be collected and paid to the state by the 
user-dealer in all cases where the fuel is sold and 
delivered directly into the service tank of a motor 
vehicle. . . . (emphasis added). 
The IFTA provisions support this concept and create a 
presumption of taxation when the fuel is placed in the supply 
tank of a motor vehicle. The Procedures Manual for IFTA tax 
reporting, Section IV.A.9 states: 
The licensee must report all fuel placed in the storage 
tank of a qualified motor vehicle as taxable on the 
IFTA tax report. Jurisdictions may define tax-exempt 
fuel. The licensee must submit a claim for refund for 
tax paid on tax-exempt fuel directly to the respective 
jurisdiction. ,fl 
There is no question that all fuel taxed in this case was 
placed in the supply tanks of Petitioners' motor vehicles. The 
Court must start therefore with the presumption that the fuel 
consumed by Petitioners is taxable. 
II. PETITIONERS HAVE FAILED TO SHOW THAT THEIR USE QUALIFIES FOR 
THE EXEMPTION. 
In order to prevail in this appeal, Petitioner must clearly 
demonstrate that there was no rational basis, on the record 
below, for the Commission to determine that the fuel consumed in 
"non-propulsion operation" was taxable "operation of a motor 
vehicle". Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-301(2) exempts fuel which: 
1
 As amended by Ballot 7-1992 Ratified Nov. 26, 1992. 
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(a) is sold or used for any purpose other than to 
operate or propel a motor vehicle upon the public 
highways of the state, but this exemption applies only 
in those cases where the purchasers or the users of 
special fuel establish to the satisfaction of the 
commission that the special fuel was used for purposes 
other than to operate a motor vehicle upon the public 
highways of the state; (emphasis added). 
Exemptions to taxation are to be narrowly construed and the 
burden of showing that the activity comes within the exemption 
rests with the person seeking exemption- See Parson, supra. 
Petitioners can not meet this burden. 
"Operate" is defined as "to control or direct the 
functioning of."2 "Propel" has a much more limited meaning; "to 
cause to move or sustain in motion."3 The limitation on the 
exemption clearly states that the user of fuel "must establish to 
the satisfaction of the Commission that the special fuel was used 
for purposes other than to operate a motor vehicle . . . ." 
Petitioners argue that fuel used in "non-propulsion operation" is 
not taxable. This argument focuses only on the concept of 
propulsion. Operation of a motor vehicle is not limited solely 
to propulsion but includes all necessary functions of the 
vehicle. 
The Legislature clearly states that unless the fuel was used 
for a purpose other than to operate a motor vehicle, then it is 
2
 Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary 823 (1st 
ed. 1988). 
3
 Id. at 943. 
9 
taxable. The Legislature delegated discretion to the Tax 
Commission to determine whether the exemption applies to specific 
facts. The Commission's determination that Petitioners' use of 
the fuel to keep its trucks running while the air brake was set 
constituted "operation" of a motor vehicle is rational and must 
be affirmed. 
III. THIS COURT NEED NOT LOOK BEYOND THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE 
STATUTE TO DETERMINE THAT PETITIONERS' USE OF SPECIAL FUEL 
IS TAXABLE. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has held that: 
Where statutory language is plain and unambiguous, 
appellate courts cannot look beyond the language to 
divine legislative intent, but must construe the 
statute according to its plain language. 
State v. Paul, 860 P.2d 992, 993 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) citing 
Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989); State v. 
Singh, 819 P.2d 356, 359 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), cert, denied, 832 
P.2d 476 (Utah 1992) . 
A. "OPERATE" AND "PROPEL" ARE PLAINLY NOT SYNONYMS. 
The statute in question is Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-301(2)(a) 
(1992) which states: 
No tax is imposed upon special fuel which: is sold or 
used for any purpose other than to operate or propel a 
motor vehicle upon the public highways of the state, 
Petitioners argue that the words "operate" and "propel" have the 
same meaning in this context. These two words clearly do not 
have the same meaning. As noted above, Webster's defines 
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"operate" as "[t]o control or direct the functioning of."* and 
"propel" as "[t]o cause to move or sustain in motion."5 It 
seems clear that one can "operate" without necessarily 
"propelling", and vice versa. Thus the words plainly and 
unambiguously define two separate and distinct actions, both of 
which may be subject to taxation in this context. 
At the hearing, Petitioners' argued that the phrase "operate 
or propel" is akin to the phrase "cease and desist". (Tr. 15) 
However, "cease" and "desist" are synonyms,6 one cannot "cease" 
without also "desisting" and vice versa. Also, the statutory 
language used throughout Utah Code Annotated chapter 59-13 uses 
the word or as in "operate or propel" rather than the word "and" 
as in "cease and desist". 
B. THE LEGISLATURE DID NOT INTEND "OPERATE" AND 
"PROPEL" TO BE UNDERSTOOD AS SYNONYMOUS. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held on numerous occasions that 
legislative intent may be discerned from the language of the 
statute in question. Thus, in State v. Masciantonio, 850 P.2d 
492 (Utah App. 1993) the Court of Appeals cited a Utah Supreme 
Court decision in declaring that 
A
 Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary, supra at 
823. 
5
 Id. at 943. 
6
 Webster's defines both as "Stop" and uses "cease" to define 
"desist". Id. 
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we construe the statute to give effect to legislative 
intent in so far as possible, and in doing so, assume 
"the Legislature used each term advisedly, and we give 
effect to each term according to its ordinary and 
accepted meaning." 
JEd., supra at 493, 494. Quoting Versluis v. Guaranty Nat'l. 
Cos., 842 P.2d 865, 867 (Utah 1992). See also State v. Paul, 8 
P.2d 992 (Utah App. 1993), In re Adoption of M.L.T., 746 P.2d 
1179 (Utah App. 1987) and Utah County v. Orem City, 699 P.2d 70 
(Utah 1985) . 
Petitioners seem to agree, in principle, arguing that "The 
intent of the [Legislature must be discerned from the language 
which it uses." (Petitioners' Brief at 11) and "all words and 
phrases used in the statute are to be construed in accordance 
with their meanings and definitions." (.Id. at 9) In support of 
these arguments, Petitioners cite Amax Magnesium Corp. v. Utah 
State Tax Commission, 796 P.2d 1256, 1258 (Utah 1990) which 
"mandates that a statute be read according to its literal 
wording." However, Petitioners then argue that the statute 
should not be read literally but rather that the "accepted 
meaning" of the word "operate" should be ignored. 
As the Tax Commission noted in its October 15th Order, 
[Utah Code Ann.] § 59-13-102(3)(d) [1992] defines 
special fuel as any fuel usable as a fuel to operate or 
propel a motor vehicle upon the highways of the state. 
The use of the word "or" to separate the word "operate" 
from [the word] "propel" evidences a legislative intent 
to list two separate and distinct processes either of 
which would render the special fuel subject to 
taxation. 
12 
(R. 26, 27. original emphasis.) Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-301(2)(a) 
(1992) clearly and unambiguously defines the circumstances under 
which the exemption applies: 
but this exemption applies only in those cases where 
the purchasers or users of special fuel establish to 
the satisfaction of the commission that the special 
fuel was used for purposes other than to overate a, 
motor vehicle upon the public highways of the state. 
The Legislature left the word "propel" out of this part of the 
code, giving the word "operate" its own significance and meaning 
independent of the word "propel". In fact, this section suggests 
that if the Legislature intended for one of the two words to have 
more importance than the other, it is the word "operate", since 
propulsion is not a factor in determining whether the exemption 
applies. At the very least it clearly indicates that the 
Legislature intended to tax special fuel used to operate a motor 
vehicle on the highways of the state. 
C. PETITIONERS OFFER NO SUPPORT FOR IGNORING THE PLAIN 
MEANING OF THE STATUTE. 
Petitioners ignore the "accepted meaning" of the word 
"operate", robbing it of any meaning at all by arguing that it is 
subsumed by the concept of propulsion. In place of the plain, 
literal wording of the statute, Petitioners offer an idea of what 
the Legislature may have intended, without citing any authority 
to support that idea. They do not cite any Legislative history 
in support of their notion. Neither do Petitioners cite any case 
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law in support of the proposition that an appellate court should 
ignore words used in a statute. 
If, as Petitioners argue, the Legislature had intended for 
the word "operate" to have no meaning of its own, the "literal 
wording" of the statute would not include the word "operate".7 
At the very least, the statute could have taxed special fuel used 
to "operate a motor vehicle while propelling it on the highways 
of the state", thus clearly linking the two separate concepts of 
"operation" and "propulsion". However, as noted above, the 
"literal wording" of the statute in question does not link these 
two separate concepts. 
Petitioners' argument that the sole legislative intent in 
taxing the use of special fuels was to tax those who inflict wear 
and tear on the state's highways is not only without support but 
is contrary to clear statements of the Legislature. If such were 
the case it would be a simple thing to tax each mile logged in 
the state without regard to the amount of fuel consumed.8 
Further, the Legislature has provided for special fuel tax 
exemptions for vehicles powered by a "clean fuel". Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-13-304(1)(b) clearly states that such exemptions are 
7
 The Idaho State Legislature recently added the word 
"operate" to its comparable code section in recognition of the fact 
that the words "operate" and "propel" define two distinct taxable 
activities. 1994 Idaho Sess. Laws Ch. 344 (H.B. 578). 
8
 Several states impose tax based on vehicle miles, or a 
combination of miles and weight in lieu of or in combination with 
a fuel tax. 
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"provided to encourage the use of clean fuels to reduce air 
pollution" thus showing that the Legislature was concerned about 
problems resulting from the use of special fuel other than simply 
highway wear and tear. 
Finally, Petitioners' admit their trucks do "extraordinary 
damage" to the highways. (Petitioners' Brief at 7.) However, 
they are taxed at the same rate as other fuel purchasers. By 
taxing "operation" as well as propulsion, the legislature may 
have intended to tax all of Petitioners' fuel consumption to help 
account for the extra stress they put on the state's highways. 
D. IF "OPERATE" AND "PROPEL" WERE SYNONYMOUS, THE 
STATUTE WOULD BE INOPERABLE. 
Finally, as Petitioners note, (Petitioners' Brief at 10) 
Amax, supra supports the idea that a statute should not be 
construed so as to make it "unreasonably confusing or 
inoperable." Jd. at 1258. The Act would be inoperable if the 
word "operate" had no meaning as Petitioners claim. If tax were 
imposed solely on fuel consumed in the propulsion of the vehicle, 
Petitioner would be entitled to a credit not only for when the 
vehicle idled with the parking brake set but for whatever 
percentage of special fuel use was due to on-highway idling, 
running the air conditioner or any other "non-propulsion 
operation." However, Petitioners have already agreed that such 
operation is taxable. (Tr. 13) 
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Petitioners attempt to tie the incidence of taxation to 
propulsion ignores the fact that even during propulsion fuel is 
consumed for "non-propulsion" activities. Fuel is consumed to 
power the air conditioner, heater, lights, compressors and other 
equipment operated during propulsion that are also operated 
during "non-propulsion operation." It would be impossible to 
determine or even approximate what percentage of special fuel was 
used to operate the other systems during propulsion. 
Petitioner would have the Court abandon the plain, 
unambiguous language of the statute, and instead adopt a standard 
which is inoperable. This court should refuse such a request. 
IV. THE TAX COMMISSION'S DECISION IS IN ACCORD WITH THE "UNIFORM 
OPERATION" PRINCIPLES OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
A. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT CONSIDER PETITIONERS' EQUAL 
PROTECTION ARGUMENT SINCE IT WAS NOT RAISED BELOW. 
At no time during the course of the proceedings below did 
Petitioners' raise the question of Equal Protection. The Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah has recently held: 
It is black-letter law that an appellate court will not 
address issues raised for the first time on appeal 
except in extraordinary circumstances that do not exist 
here. 
State v. Smith, 229 Ut. Adv. Rep. 3, 3 (Utah 1994). Citing Onq 
Int'l, Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455 (Utah 1993); 
State v. Allen, 839 P.2d 291, 302 (Utah 1992) and State v. 
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Steqgell, 660 P.2d 252, 254 (Utah 1983).9 This rule holds 
whether or not it is an entirely new issue or just a new argument 
that is raised for the first time on appeal. See Onq, supra at 
455, citing Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. of Ed., 797 P.2d 412, 
413 (Utah 1990) citing Pratt v. City Council, 639 P.2d 172, 173-
74 (Utah 1981). (Other citations omitted). Since Petitioners 
did not raise this question below, this court should not consider 
it for the first time on appeal. 
B. WHETHER THE COMMISSION HAS APPLIED THE STATUTE 
UNIFORMLY IS JUDGED ON A RATIONAL-BASIS STANDARD. 
Petitioners' bring their claim under Article I, section 24 
of the Utah State Constitution. The Supreme Court has held that: 
In scrutinizing a legislative measure under article I, 
§ 24, we must determine whether the classification is 
reasonable, whether the objectives of the legislative 
action are legitimate, and whether there is a 
reasonable relationship between the classification and 
the legislative purposes. 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah 
1989), citing Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 
752 P.2d 884, 890 (Utah 1988) and Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 
9
 See also Zion's First Nat'l Bank v. National Am. Title Ins. 
Co., 749 P.2d 651, 655 (Utah 1988); Hamilton v. Hamilton, 232 Ut. 
Adv. Rep. 27, 32 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Wade v. Staql, 232 Ut. 
Adv. Rep. 19, 20 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P.2d 
922, 926 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 71 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990) and James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987). 
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670-75 (Utah 1984). See also. Little America Hotel v. Salt Lake 
City, 785 P.2d 1106, 1107-08 (Utah 1989) •10 
The Court in Blue Cross, went on to say: 
In the tax area, as in other areas of purely economic 
regulation, we give broad deference to the legislature 
when scrutinizing the reasonableness of its 
classifications and their relationship to legitimate 
legislative purpose. 
Blue Cross at 637. (Citations omitted). Thus, the first step in 
the analysis is to determine the inherent reasonableness of the 
classifications themselves. Id., at 640. 
Classifications are not unreasonable or arbitrary as 
long as similarly situated people are dealt with in a 
similar manner and people situated differently are not 
treated as if their circumstances were the same. ... 
Thus, the law holds a discrimination invalid only if 
there is no reasonable basis for the classification. 
J.J.N.P. Co. v. State, etc., 655 P.2d 1133, 1137-38 (Utah 1982). 
C. PETITIONERS' USE OF SPECIAL FUEL DIFFERS FROM THOSE 
USES RECOGNIZED AS EXEMPT BY THE COMMISSION. 
Petitioners are not similarly situated with exempted users. 
There is a reasonable basis to distinguish between exempted uses 
of special fuel, such as operating power take-off units, and 
Petitioners' use of special fuel. In Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-
10
 Petitioners' only stated challenge is to the validity of 
the statutory distinction between Petitioners' use of special fuel 
in the non-propulsion operation of their motor vehicles and those 
who use special fuel for purposes "other than to operate a motor 
vehicle" made in Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-301(2) (a) . They do not 
challenge the legitimacy of the legislative objectives of the Act 
nor the rational basis of the relationship between the 
classifications and those legislative objectives. Nonetheless, all 
three prongs of the test are addressed infra. 
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301(2)(a) the Legislature made clear that unless special fuel was 
used for a purpose other than to operate a motor vehicle, that is 
to run or to use a motor vehicle, that use would be taxable. The 
Tax Commission has addressed the question of whether fuel used 
for "non-propulsion operation" is taxable. Rule R865-4-2D(D)(5) 
states: 
Special fuel used on-highway for purposes of idling a 
vehicle is not exempt from the special fuel tax since 
the fuel is used in the operation of a motor vehicle. 
(emphasis added). 
Thus, the Commission has defined "operation" of "a motor 
vehicle" to include idling or "non-propulsion operation." The 
Commission reiterated this position in its Final Decision. (R. 
26, 27) The key is that Petitioners' do not use the fuel for a 
purpose "other than to operate a motor vehicle." The fact that 
the parking brake may be set may indicate that the vehicle is not 
being propelled, however, as argued above, this does not mean the 
vehicle is not in operation. While the fuel may not be consumed 
to propel the vehicle, fuel consumed in "non-propulsion 
operation" is still consumed in the operation of the vehicle. 
Petitioners attempt to equate their use of special fuel to 
operate a motor vehicle with uses exempted because those uses are 
for "purposes other than to operate a motor vehicle". In keeping 
with this language from Utah Code Ann. 59-13-301(2)(a), Tax 
Commission Rule R865-4-2D(D) defines fuel used for "other 
purposes" as fuel used to power concrete mixers, garbage 
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compactors, pumps, conveyers, or other unloading equipment that 
is not a part of the motor vehicle and not associated with the 
normal operation of a motor vehicle. The rule identifies motor 
vehicles with power take-off units where the power take-off is 
used to run "auxiliary equipment." This is a rational 
distinction since running auxiliary equipment such as pumps and 
conveyers is not deemed "operating a motor vehicle on the public 
highways of the state." While this rule recognizes that fuel 
used for these "other purposes" is consumed for purposes "other 
than to operate a motor vehicle" it specifically states that fuel 
consumed idling is used in the operation of the vehicle. There 
is no "other use" made of the fuel. The vehicle remains 
operating at the discretion of the driver or the direction of the 
company. No "other purpose" is served that does not relate to 
the normal operation of the motor vehicle. The factors which 
influence the Petitioners' decision to operate the motor vehicle 
in this fashion must be weighed against the cost of operating the 
vehicle, including taxable fuel consumed in that operation. 
There is a distinct difference between Petitioners' use of 
special fuel and the exempted uses identifed in the rule. The 
Commission did not "create" this exemption in its rules, the 
Legislature provided for it by statute. The Commission merely 
recognized that running power take-off units is different from 
operating a motor vehicle. Such uses of special fuel involve 
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simply running "auxiliary equipment" with a "separate drive 
train" as Petitioners also recognized at the hearing. (Tr. 20) 
Rule R865-4-2D(D) merely clarifies the exemption which the 
Legislature provided in Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-301(2) (a) by 
identifying specific instances where it has been demonstrated to 
the satisfaction of the Commission that the fuel was used for 
purposes "other than to operate a motor vehicle". 
D. THE ACT IS A PERMISSIBLE MEANS TO A ACHIEVE A 
LEGITIMATE LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE. 
The broad deference that courts will grant the Legislature 
in determining the reasonableness of the relationship between 
classifications and purposes means that: 
Under the rational-basis, or least restrictive 
standard, a statutory classification is constitutional 
unless it has no rational relationship to any 
reasonably conceivable legislative purpose. 
Lee v. Gaufin, 227 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 7 (Utah 1993). (Citations 
omitted). 
A court should assume that both the classifications and the 
legislative purpose of the act are constitutional, even if that 
purpose is unstated, unless the classification results in an 
"invidious discrimination" or there is no rational relationship 
between the two. Id. at 7 and n.10. (Citations omitted). 
Though the Court will not "accept any conceivable reason for 
the legislation" Blue Cross at 637, (citing Malan, 693 P.2d at 
671 n. 14.) it does not require that the legislative purpose be 
stated or proven. Id. at 641. Nor does Article I section 24 of 
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the Utah Constitution require the Legislature to be "perfect" or 
"logically precise" in its classifications. It only requires 
that the Legislature draw these classifications in a 
"permissible" fashion. See Little America, 785 P.2d at 1108 and 
Blue Cross, 779 P.2d at 644. 
Raising revenue has been determined a legitimate legislative 
purpose for tax statutes challenged under article I, § 24. See 
Little America at 1108, Blue Cross at 640 and Mountain Fuel, 752 
P.2d at 890-91. Therefore, the tax statute in question satisfies 
the second prong of the Blue Cross test. 
The final prong is the reasonableness of the relationship 
between the classification and the legislative purpose. 
The legislature is not to be denied an "effective means 
of raising needed revenues unless that means imposes an 
unreasonable burden on the affected parties." 
Blue Cross at 645. Quoting Mountain Fuel at 891. See also. 
Little America at 1108. Petitioners originally filed returns 
recognizing the taxability of their operation and paying the tax. 
(R. W-ll) Petitioners' have failed to show that they are unduly 
burdened by this tax. Such failure has been fatal in similar 
cases, and should be here. See gen. Little America and Blue 
Cross. 
V. THE ACT DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH THE RELEVANT IFTA PROVISIONS. 
Utah is a party to the International Fuel Tax Agreement 
(IFTA). The enabling legislation for that act provides: 
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If the Commission enters into any agreement under the 
authority of this section, and the provisions 
established in the agreement are in conflict with any 
rules promulgated by the Commission, the agreement 
provisions prevail. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-501(7) (1988) (emphasis added). Nothing 
in the Rules conflicts with the relevant IFTA provisions. 
Petitioner has cited no rule which it deems to conflict with any 
provision of IFTA, nor has it demonstrated that invalidation of 
any such rule would require a different result than was reached 
by the Commission. The enabling legislation upon which 
Petitioners rely is clear. It does not provide that IFTA 
provisions should prevail over any statutory provisions. Such a 
delegation of power would be to grant more power to the IFTA 
Board of Directors than retained by the Legislature! The 
Commission's ruling in this case is based on the plain language 
of the Statute. Nothing in the statute is in conflict with the 
IFTA provisions, nor would IFTA prevail if it were. 
Petitioners' argument displays a basic lack of understanding 
of the International Fuel Tax Agreement. Nothing in the 
agreement can be construed as "imposing" any tax, or as limiting 
the imposition of tax by the participating states. The purpose 
of the agreement is "to enable participating jurisdictions to act 
cooperatively and provide mutual assistance in the administration 
and collection of motor fuel taxes." IFTA Articles of Agreement 
Section I.e. Under IFTA, both the imposition of taxes and the 
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granting of exemptions are left exclusively to the states. The 
Procedures Manual for IFTA tax reporting, Section IV,A.9 states: 
The licensee must report all fuel placed in the storage 
tank of a qualified motor vehicle as taxable on the 
IFTA tax report. Jurisdictions may define tax-exempt 
fuel. The licensee must submit a claim for refund for 
tax-exempt fuel directly to the respective 
jurisdiction.u 
Utah has imposed a tax on all fuel sold or used. It has 
exempted fuel used for purposes "other than operation of a motor 
vehicle." Petitioners' use is taxable. It has not demonstrated 
"to the satisfaction of the commission" that its use falls within 
the exemption. The definition of the exemption and its 
application to petitioners in this instance are in perfect 
harmony with the provisions of the International Fuel Tax 
Agreement. 
CONCLUSION 
The applicable statutes, rules and IFTA provisions create a 
presumption that all fuel sold and placed in the supply tank of a 
motor vehicle is taxable. That presumption must hold unless 
Petitioners have established to the satisfaction of the 
Commission that the fuel they claim is exempt was used for 
purposes "other than to operate a motor vehicle on the public 
highways of the state." They failed to do so. The Commission 
determined that "non-propulsion operation", as defined by 
Petitioners, constituted "operation" of a motor vehicle on the 
11
 As amended by Ballot 7-1992 ratified Nov. 26 1992. 
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public highways of the state. There is no practical distinction 
between the "non-propulsion operation" Petitioners seek to exempt 
from taxation and that which they agree is taxable. Non-
propulsion operation, unlike exempted uses, is still "operation" 
of the motor vehicle and therefore taxable* Exemptions should be 
narrowly construed and Petitioner bears the burden to show that 
its activity comes squarely within the exemption. Petitioners 
have failed to meet that burden. The Commission's decision is 
rational and must be upheld. 
DATED this /*V h day of July, 1994. 
ULARK L. 'SNELSON " 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610(1): 
When reviewing formal adjudicative proceedings commenced 
before the commission, the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court 
shall: 
(a) grant the commission deference concerning its written 
findings of fact, applying a substantial evidence 
standard on review; and 
(b) grant the commission no deference concerning its 
conclusions of law, applying a correction or error 
standard, unless there is an explicit grant of discretion 
contained in a statute at issue before the appellate 
court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-102 (1992 & Supp. 1993): 
(3)(d) "Special fuel" means any fuel regardless of name or 
character that: 
(i) is usable as fuel to operate or propel a motor 
vehicle upon the public highways of the state; and 
(7) "Use," as used in Part 3, means the consumption of 
special fuel for the operation or propulsion of a motor 
vehicle upon the public highways of the state and 
includes the reception of special fuel into the fuel 
supply tank of a motor vehicle. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-301 (1992): 
(1) A tax is imposed at the rate of 19 cents per gallon 
on the sale or use of special fuel. 
(2) No tax is imposed upon special fuel which: 
(a) is sold or used for any purpose other than 
to operate or propel a motor vehicle upon the 
public highways of the state, but this 
exemption applies only in those cases where 
the purchasers or the users of special fuel 
establish to the satisfaction of the 
commission that the special fuel was used for 
purposes other than to operate a motor vehicle 
upon the public highways of the state; 
(b) is sold to the United States Government or 
any of its instrumentalities or to this state 
or any of its political subdivisions; or 
(c) is sold and delivered into a motor vehicle 
for which the owner or operator possesses an 
unexpired special fuel tax exemption 
certificate issued to that owner or operator 
by the commission as provided in Section 59-
13-304 for vehicles powered by certain special 
fuels• 
(3) The special fuel tax shall be paid by the user-dealer 
in all cases where the special fuel is sold within the 
state and delivered directly into the fuel supply tank of 
a motor vehicle unless the motor vehicle has a current 
special fuel exemption certificate as provided in Section 
59-13-304, 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-302 (1992): 
(2) The user-dealer license application shall state: 
(a) the places of business and locations from 
which sales are made into motor vehicles or 
from which retail sales of special fuel are 
made; 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-501 (1992): 
(1) The commission may enter into cooperative agreements 
with other states for the exchange of information and 
auditing of users of motor fuel and special fuels used in 
fleets of motor vehicles operated or intended to operate 
interstate. 
(7) If the commission enters into any agreement under the 
authority of this section, and the provisions established 
in the agreement are in conflict with any rules 
promulgated by the commission, the agreement provisions 
prevail. 
Tax Comm. Rules R865-4-2D 
B. The tax shall be collected and paid to the state by 
the user-dealer in all cases where the fuel is sold and 
delivered directly into the service tank of a motor 
vehicle except in the following two cases: 
1. The fuel is sold or delivered into vehicles 
of the U.S. Government or to the state of Utah 
or any of its political subdivisions. 
2. The fuel is sold or delivered into a motor 
vehicle for which the owner or operator 
possesses an unexpired Special Fuel Tax 
Exemption Certificate. 
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D. No excise tax is imposed upon special fuel which is 
sold or used for any purpose other than to operate or 
propel a motor vehicle upon the public highways of the 
state. For special fuel user-dealers this means that the 
excise tax is not charged on bulk sales of special fuel 
and other sales of special fuel where delivery is made 
into a container other than the service tank of a motor 
vehicle. For special fuel users this means that the 
special fuel tax exemption is allowed for the following 
three types of special fuel use: 
1. Use other than in motor vehicles. 
2. Use in vehicles off-highway. 
3. Use in motor vehicles with power take-off 
units. 
4. Allowances herein provided for will be 
recognized only if adequate records are 
maintained to support the amount claimed. 
5. Special fuel used on-highway for purposes 
of idling a vehicle is not exempt from the 
special fuel tax since the fuel is used in the 
operation of a motor vehicle. 
IFTA Articles of Agreement 
I.C It is the purpose of this Agreement to enable 
participating jurisdictions to act cooperatively and 
provide mutual assistance in the administration and 
collection of motor fuels use taxes. 
III.C All motor fuel acquired that is normally subject to 
consumption tax is taxable unless proof to the contrary 
is provided by the licensee. 
IFTA Procedures Manual 
IV.A.9 The licensee must report all fuel placed in the 
supply tank of a qualified motor vehicle as taxable on 
the IFTA tax report. Jurisdictions may define tax-exempt 
fuel. The licensee must submit a claim for refund for 
tax paid on tax-exempt fuel directly to the respective 
jurisdiction. 
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